Preprint / scholarly article

Observable-Only Structural-Risk Institutions Without Central Arbitration

K. Takahashi

Published
DOI
10.5281/zenodo.18666605

Full text PDF (Zenodo)

Abstract

The preprint develops observable-only, no-meta institutional rules for structural risk in competitive AI systems, proving deterrence and non-domination conditions with escrow-based reversibility, coalition-aware repeated-game guarantees, and finite-sample heavy-tail certification under auditable public records.

Keywords

  • structural risk institutions
  • observable-only
  • no-meta governance
  • decentralized arbitration
  • repeated games
  • coalition deterrence
  • escrow reversibility
  • heavy-tail certification
  • finite-sample guarantees
  • AI safety institutions
  • public auditability

Identifiers and source records